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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks are widely being used today. Though efficient, fast and easy to use these wireless sensors 
are highly vulnerable. Once installed, they do not need any further maintenance.  Therefore they are less secure. An attacker can 
study the network behavior and easily attack these sensors. There are many safety measures taken for this. There are software’s 
available to detect malicious sensors. The greatest challenge in the wireless sensor network security is when more number of 
sensors are infected. It becomes difficult to decide which sensor is malicious and which is genuine. This leads to the study of 
Wireless Sensor Network Security. This paper shows various security measures taken and some challenges faced by them.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
WSNs are frequently used for detecting events in the space across different applications. These applications 
include military surveillance[1], health[2], and environment (e.g., volcano) monitoring[3]. The basic function of 
these sensors is to take measurements and interpret them. These measurements are taken to identify events. These 
events give particular conditions followed by a remedial response. Therefore these measurements contain significant 
consequences and cost and also become critical resource to secure.
The measurements are somehow replaced by the attacker. This leads to the study of malicious data injections. 
These injected data are exploited by an attacker to evoke false events. False events for example fire alarm when 
there is no fire, triggering intrusion alarm when there is no intruder etc. This way, measurements can be taken 
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control of. There are many studies in the literature address and physical and network layer threats for protecting the
integrity of the measurements. However, the measurements can be compromised even before they are transmitted. 
Therefore there are many remedial measures taken to overcome this.
There are few observable properties in the presence of malicious data injections that can help in detection i.e. 
checking the integrity of the sensor for which software attestation technique is introduced [6]. However through 
environment manipulation injections cannot be detected since software is still genuine.
Another approach is observing the measurements reported by these sensors. An analysis is made based on the 
measurements of these sensors. Its applicability relies on the assumption that measurements are correlated under 
genuine circumstances while compromised measurements deviate from these measurements. These deviated 
measurements are important for this approach since without this analysis and comparison will not be possible.
2. Related Works
2.1. Insider Attacker Detection
This is accomplished by exploring the correlation among neighboring sensors [4]. Sensors are expected to be 
burdened with similar communication and computation workloads in a typical sensor network with collaborative in-
network processing. On the other hand, an internal adversary misbehaves by showing readings that deviates from 
actual readings of the sensors. When a significant change takes place in the reading of a sensor as compared to the 
normal reading of the sensor reading in the network that sensor is considered to be malicious. Here each sensor 
reports about its neighboring sensor. If a sensor is compromised then the neighboring sensors would report this. The 
decision is made by the majority voting of these sensors. This is implemented by an algorithm which has the 
following characteristics:
x It explores the spatial correlation in neighborhood activities, and requires no prior knowledge 
aboutnormal or malicious sensors.
x It is generic, which can monitor many aspects of sensor networking behaviors.By comparing the 
measurements with a predetermined threshold, this algorithm should be more precise and more robust 
since the actual measurements are used without any approximation.
x It is localized with the information exchange restrictedto a limited neighborhood. High detection 
accuracy can be obtained with as many as 25% malicious sensors in the network.
The basic aim of the algorithm is detecting the insider attacker whose behaviours are abnormal compared to 
normal sensors. The three steps involved in the process are:
1. Collecting local information.
2. Filtering collected data.
3. Identifying the outliers.
4. Applying majority voting to obtain final list of outlying sensors. 
However, when the malicious sensors are more it would be difficult to detect whether the reporting is from a 
genuine sensor or malicious one.
2.2. Anomaly Detection
The data from neighboring sensors in a distributed WSN are collected [5]. This approach utilizes and applies 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) simultaneously to different metrics received from various sensors. The basic 
goal of this approach is to retain the variation present in the sensor reading dataset by reducing its dimensionality 
where there are a large no of interrelated variables. Also, it helps in the detection of correlated anomalies/attacks by 
integrating the results of neighboring networks. 
One of the key features of this approach is that,in order to reveal anomalies that span through a number of 
neighboring sensors,it provides an integrated methodology by effectively combining correlated sensor data, in a 
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distributed fashion. Also,to detect correlated anomalies/ attacks that involve multiple groups of sensors it allows 
the integration of results from neighboring network regions. This can be used theoretically to identify an 
abnormal situation in measurements (e.g., cases where actual measurements taken deviates from normal ones) to
discover the existence of faulty sensors, detection of potential network attacks, and filter reports that seems to 
be suspicious throughout the overall decision making process. 
This is implemented by considering a network that contains sensors with different processing capabilit ies and 
execute different functions. An algorithm that correlates metrics from neighboring sensorsis taken up, to detect 
the node(s) containing anomalies in itscorresponding network graph. In order to fragment the detectionalgorithm, 
the sensor network is divided into groups ofsensors. 
This anomaly detection procedure is divided into twodifferent parts, first is the offline analysis thatcreates a 
model of the normal pattern of the monitored parameters,and the real- time analysis that detects anomalies which 
is done by comparingthe current (actual) with the modeled ones. The input ofthe offline analysis is a correlation 
matrix which is the diagonal matrixcontaining the correlation coefficients of all the monitored metricsof a sampled 
data set. PCA isenforced on this data set and then the first few most significant derivedprincipal components 
(PCs) are selected, during the offline analysis. The number ofthe selected PCs depends on the sensor network 
and the numberof virtual nodes. Thisprocedure is computationally heavy; it must be carried out onlywhen there 
is a significant change in one or more of the correlationcoefficients. 
However, this would confine only to very small neighborhoods where collusion attack would be successful 
if all sensors are compromised. Detecting collusion attack needs broad neighborhood.
2.3. False Data Injection Attack
If an attacker can determine the current system configuration he can create false measurements in the network
[8]. This allows the attacker to bypass the safeguards in the network. The reason for this is because the majority of 
the existing algorithms rely on the fact that “when bad measurements take place, the squares of differences between 
the observed measurements and their corresponding estimates often become significant [9].” In order to gain insight 
of this vulnerability a new class of attack is analyzed called “False Data Injection Attacks”. This is basically a study 
showing how an attacker takes over some of the sensors in the network and creates false measurements.
Initially it is assumed that the attacker can access the current power system configuration information and 
manipulate the measurements of meters at locations that are physically protectedsuch as substations; such attacks 
can injectarbitraryerrors into certain state variables such thatit would not bedetected by existing algorithms. Also, 
two scenarios are followed, where the attacker is either constrainedto a specific distance or limited in the resources 
required to compromise the distance. It is shown that the attackercan systematically and efficiently construct attack 
vectors in both scenarios in order to change the results of stateestimation randomly.Theseattacks are extended to
ageneralized false data injection attack, whichcan further increase the impact by exploiting the measurement errors 
which is usually tolerated in state estimation.
However, this only limits overall inconsistency, while still disrupting the reported value.
2.4. Indisputable Code Execution
This is a method represented by SCUBA (Secure Code Update By Attestation) protocol [10]. This protocol 
enables the base station to perform code updates.  This is based on the principle that if a sensor consists of malicious 
code then it would interfere with the update. 
This is implemented setting of a sensor network where an attackerhas compromised sensor nodes by injecting 
malicious code intotheir memory. The base station verifies the code memorycontents of the nodes, and the node is
either repaired by undoing anychanges made by the attacker or is blacklisted if cannotbe repaired.
SCUBA enables the base station to perform codeupdates to sensor nodes. The protocol assumes the presence of
malicious code that would try tointerfere with the update. For example, if the base station sends acode patch, 
malicious code on the node may pretend to have installed the patch. In order to keep the problem under control, it 
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isassumed that theattacker’s hardware devices are not present in the sensor network during the repair process. In 
spite of this assumption,the protocol has an advantage since circumventing the malicious noderequires the attacker’s 
hardware to be always present in the sensornetwork. This significantly decreases the attacker’s defense comparedto 
the situation where the attacker need to only be physicallypresent intermittently in the network to compromise 
sensor nodes.
A challenge response protocol of SCUBA is created, called ICE (Indisputable Code Execution). It is installed 
between base station and sensor node. This guarantees that the base station would obtain unhampered code 
execution from sensors. This follows a three step procedure to achieve unhampered code:
1. Checking if the executable files is not hampered before even it is executed. 
2. To maintain the execution environment so that the execution is atomic. 
3. Invoke the executable to execute in unhampered execution environment. 
It is also required to make sure that the ICE code itself is not infected since it is alsosoftware.
However, further evaluation is required in concrete deployment i.e. in the case of environment outside the control 
of research lab, that injectionsthrough environment manipulation cannot be detected throughattestation since the 
software is still genuine.
2.5. Detecting Malicious Data in Event Detection Wireless Sensor Networks
This Method proposes anovel algorithm in order to identify malicious data injections and buildmeasurement 
estimates that are resistant to several compromisedsensors even when the attack is by collusion [14]. The scenario 
follows two algorithms as shown in figure 1. Firstly, two sensor nodes are taken randomly in the network and an 
estimate of their readings is taken and then a similarity test is taken comparing the actual reading and the estimate. If 
the similarity test fails then there is a compromised node in the network. Then a characterization procedure is done 
where the sensors showing highest deviation is removed from the network then again the remaining sensors undergo 
similarity check. This process continues until all sensors in the network are genuine. This process is customizable 
and can be used in different types of network.
Fig. 1. Outline of the algorithm
3. Trade-offs  to be dealt with in Detecting Malicious Data in Event Detection Wireless Sensor Networks
Problems do occur when there are more colluded sensors. This hampers the estimate. Thus it would affect the 
similarity check as well. Wrong estimation would not give proper result which is the biggest challenge of this 
process. In this approach, the number of compromised sensors that can be tolerated is correlation-dependant. Some 
experiments were conducted [14] where this method could tolerate up to 88% of compromised sensors whereas 
other methods could tolerate hardly 50%. However, if the number of malicious sensors exceeds the limit the 
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estimate would not be accurate and in that case human assessment would be required. The functionalities and 
disadvantages of the given methods are listed below.
     Table 1. List of functionalities and disadvantages of malicious sensor detection methods.
Name Method Function Disadvantage
Majority Voting Insider Attacker 
Detection in 
Wireless Sensor 
Networks [4]
Reporting of 
neighboring 
sensors for 
keeping track of 
the network.
Majority malicious 
nodes would 
hamper reporting.
Anomaly Detection Anomaly 
Detection Based 
Secure In-Network 
Aggregation for 
Wireless Sensor 
Networks [5]
Receives metrics
from readings of
neighboring 
sensors and 
reduces its 
dimensionality.
Need a broad 
neighborhood.
False Data Injection False data 
injection attacks 
against state 
estimation in 
electric power 
grids [8]
Study on method 
by which False 
data is injected by 
attacker.
Malicious Sensors 
are not removed 
completely
Indisputable Code Execution SCUBA: Secure 
Code Update By 
Attestation in 
sensor networks
[10]
Detecting Malicious Data in Event Detection 
Wireless Sensor Network
Detecting 
Malicious Data 
Injections in 
EventDetection 
Wireless Sensor 
Networks[14]
Creates an 
estimate of sensor 
readings and 
compares with 
actual sensor 
readings. 
Eliminates 
malicious sensors 
using algorithm. 
Increased 
collusion by 
malicious sensors 
hampers the 
estimate.
4. Conclusion
It is identified that wireless sensor networks are highly vulnerable. Many solutions have been proposed and some 
had drawbacks and some were not compatible to all networks. By majority voting system of the sensors would not 
give proper report if more sensors are infected in the network. Analyzing the signals also would not be of any use if 
the signal is corrupted even before it is transmitted. Software attestation technique would differ from network to 
network. The main factor to deal with is collusion of sensors. Dealing with collusion and the occurrence of events 
makes the problem of detecting malicious data injections more complex because both affect the dynamics of the 
system and comparisons between measurements. Furthermore, they interact with each other as collusion may 
leverage deviations in sensed values introduced by the event.
This challenge faced by detection of malicious data in event detection wireless sensor networks has exposed 
several tradeoffs in its algorithm design. Resistance to collusion over broader set of sensors would lead to higher 
complexity and computational cost, usually visible in selection of neighborhoods especially when there are multiple 
383 Nisha Vijayan and Alphonsa Johny /  Procedia Technology  25 ( 2016 )  378 – 383 
neighbors. Another trade-off is while merging information with potentially malicious sources. Taking an estimate 
would be difficult as when there is more number of malicious sensors which could compensate for each other.
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